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Abstract: I show that Kavka’s toxin puzzle raises a problem for the 
“Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically 
does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such 
intervention would undermine the possibility of our being responsible 
for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to 
require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka’s toxin story 
cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future time even 
though when that time comes, there will be no good reason for 
performing that action (and very good reason not to). I assess various 
approaches to solving this problem. Along the way, I develop an 
iterated version of Kavka’s toxin case and argue that the case is not 
adequately handled by standard causal decision theory. 
 
 
Kavka’s “toxin puzzle” (Kavka 1983) presents us with a delightfully perplexing 
problem in the theory of practical rationality. In Kavka’s story, an agent (let’s call her 
Verity) is approached by an “eccentric billionaire” who offers to pay Verity one million 
dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, she intends to drink a vial of a 
certain toxin tomorrow afternoon. Drinking the toxin would leave Verity feeling ill for 
a while, but Verity would gladly undergo a short period of nausea if it meant that she 
would receive such a large sum of money. Unfortunately for Verity, however, if Kavka 
is right she will not be able to intend to drink the toxin (at least not if she is rational), 
and thus will not be able to profit from the billionaire’s proposition. To see why, note 
that the benefit attaches to the intention to drink and not to the act of drinking itself. 
If Verity succeeded in intending to drink the toxin at midnight, then tomorrow 
afternoon Verity would have no reason to actually ingest the toxin since she would 
have already received the million dollars earlier that morning (and since she would 
 2 
know that receiving the money was not in any way contingent on her actually drinking 
the toxin). And of course if she failed to form the intention and thus received no 
money, then she would have no reason to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. Since 
Verity knows all this, she knows that she will have no reason to drink the toxin 
tomorrow (and will have ample reason not to drink it) and thus she cannot rationally 
form the intention to drink the toxin. Or so Kavka claims. It is initially hard to believe 
that Verity would be unable to profit in this situation, and despite the straightforward 
line of reasoning offered by Kavka, some philosophers have contested his conclusion.1 
In this paper, I argue that Kavka’s toxin puzzle raises a thorny problem for what is 
arguably the most promising theistic response to the problem of evil. This response 
may be called the “Responsibility Theodicy,” since it holds that one of God’s aims in 
creating the world is the existence of creatures who are significantly responsible for 
much of the good in that world, and that this fact can explain the prevalence of 
genuinely pointless evil. This theodicy faces a significant and as yet unnoticed 
problem. For reasons that I will explain, the theodicy seems to require that God be 
able to do what Verity cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future time 
even though when that time comes, there will be no good reason for performing that 
action (and very good reason not to). This poses a quandary for any advocate of the 
Responsibility Theodicy who (like myself) is sympathetic to Kavka’s claim that Verity 
cannot rationally drink the toxin (and consequently cannot intend to do so). My aim 
in this paper is to consider whether the Responsibility Theodicy can be maintained 
without departing from Kavka’s diagnosis of the toxin puzzle. I bring mixed news for 
the theodicist: there are various responses to the toxin puzzle that may be made on 
behalf of the Responsibility Theodicy, but none of these are philosophically 
unproblematic. 
The paper has five sections. In section 1, I show what is at stake by sketching the 
Responsibility Theodicy and identifying its explanatory advantages over rival theistic 
explanations of evil. In section 2, I show why the Responsibility Theodicy implies that 
God faces a conundrum similar to the one Verity faces in Kavka’s toxin story. In 
section 3, I canvass some possible solutions to the problem that are ultimately 
unsatisfactory, either because they involve contestable metaphysical or moral claims 
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or because they significantly weaken the explanatory power of the Responsibility 
Theodicy. In section 4 I develop a “decision theoretic” solution that I judge to be the 
most promising answer to the problem of God’s toxin puzzle. The decision theoretic 
solution depends on the fact that God’s situation is analogous to an iterated toxin case 
rather than a one shot toxin case like the one discussed by Kavka. Unfortunately, if 
causal decision theory is correct, the iterated nature of God’s toxin puzzle does not 
help: God still has no reason to “ingest” the toxin. But I argue that causal decision 
theory mishandles the iterated toxin case, and that the correct decision theory will 
support the decision theoretic solution. Finally, in section 5 I show that despite the 
advantages of the decision theoretic solution, the solution does place certain 
constraints on the evils that the Responsibility Theodicy could be used to explain. 
 
1. The Responsibility Theodicy 
 
According to the Responsibility Theodicy, it is a great good for creatures to be 
significantly responsible for the positive wellbeing experienced by others, and to 
exercise this responsibility through loving and morally courageous free actions 
(Swinburne 2004, chs. 10-11). Plausibly, the value of this responsibility is enhanced if 
creatures are responsible not only for contributing positive goods to the lives of 
others, but also for averting and overcoming evils (by opposing oppression, 
befriending the lonely, healing the sick, and so on). Without responsibility for 
overcoming such evils, the scope and moral seriousness of creaturely responsibility 
would be significantly curtailed (Swinburne 2004, 224-5).  
Given certain plausible assumptions, God’s consistently pursuing the good of 
serious creaturely responsibility makes it a near certainty that there will be a 
significant amount of evil. To see why, consider what must be the case in order for 
Lola to have the desired sort of responsibility for Cyril’s wellbeing. Lola must be in a 
situation where she faces a free choice between some good action G that positively 
affects Cyril and some less good or bad action B that results in Cyril suffering some 
significant evil E. Could God give Lola the free choice between G and B and then cause 
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Lola to freely choose G? The Responsibility Theodicy sides with incompatibilists in 
holding that God could not do this, since Lola’s freely choosing G is not compatible 
with her being causally determined to make this choice. Even if God merely made it 
overwhelmingly likely that Lola chooses G (for example by giving her an extremely 
virtuous moral character), this would arguably diminish the extent to which Lola can 
be responsible for the right choice. So if God desires that Lola be significantly 
responsible for Cyril’s wellbeing, then arguably God must create a context where Lola’s 
choosing B is not made overwhelmingly improbable by factors outside of Lola’s 
control. Could God’s decision to give Lola the choice between G and B be based on 
whether she would in fact choose G? Arguably not, since before Lola makes her 
choice, it is doubtful whether there is a knowable fact (or even a fact at all) about what 
she would freely choose if given the opportunity.2 Finally, could God give Lola the 
choice between G and B but resolve to intervene if Lola chooses B in order to stop this 
action from resulting in evil E? No, not without forfeiting the possible good of Lola’s 
being responsible for averting E. Lola’s choosing G can be credited with averting evil E 
only if a different choice would have resulted in E.3 Thus, the divine intention to 
intervene to stop the occurrence of E would prevent Lola from having morally serious 
responsibility for Cyril. 
If the above line of reasoning is correct, then in order for God to pursue the good 
of Lola’s positively exercising significant responsibility for Cyril, God must bring about 
a set of circumstances where there is substantial risk of significant evil. Thus, if 
significant creaturely responsibility (of a morally serious sort) is highly valuable, 
valuable enough to pursue even if such pursuit risks significant evil, then we have an 
explanation for why there is significant evil.4 If God consistently pursues the good of 
significant creaturely responsibility, then the probability that there will be a large 
quantity of evil rapidly approaches 1. 
A significant count in favor of the Responsibility Theodicy is that unlike “Defeat 
Theodicies,” the Responsibility Theodicy does not affirm that every evil makes possible 
some greater good that depends on the evil for its realization.5 If Lola chooses B and 
causes Cyril to suffer, that suffering may be completely pointless, with no upside 
whatsoever. God may permit B (and evil E that results) not because E is necessary for 
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the attainment of some good, but only because the possibility of E was necessary to 
secure the possibility of some great good (namely, Lola’s being responsible for 
rescuing Cyril from E). The proponent of the Responsibility Theodicy can hold that if 
God could have known in advance that Lola would choose B, then God would not have 
given her the free choice at all. For Lola’s having a free choice to do good or evil might 
be of little to no intrinsic value, being significantly valuable only because it makes 
possible the positive use of free choice to significantly improve Cyril’s wellbeing. 
Because the Responsibility Theodicy does not require affirming that evils somehow 
serve the greater good, the Responsibility Theodicy does not threaten to clash with 
commonsense views about what attitudes we ought to take towards nasty evils. This is 
arguably a significant count in favor of the Responsibility Theodicy over Defeat 
Theodicies.6 Defeat Theodicies do threaten to clash with these commonsense 
attitudes, since it is hard to see why we should hope that evils do not occur (and 
grieve when they do) if those evils contribute to some outweighing good that depends 
on some such evil for its realization.  
 
2. God’s Toxin Puzzle 
 
If the Responsibility Theodicy is correct, then God faces a divine version of the 
toxin puzzle. Here’s why. As explained in the last section, in order for God to pursue 
the good of Lola’s being responsible for rescuing Cyril from E, God must ensure that 
were Lola to choose bad action B, God would not intervene in order to stop E’s 
resulting from B. But the same sort of reasoning that (according to Kavka) makes it 
irrational for Verity to drink the toxin would seem also to make it irrational for God to 
refrain from intervening in the event that Lola chooses B. For if Lola does choose B, 
then God will no longer have any reason to refrain from intervening to stop E. This is 
because the only reason for nonintervention was to make possible the good of Lola’s 
rescuing Cyril from E, and once Lola has chosen B this good is no longer a possibility 
and thus cannot supply any reasons for acting. Moreover, God will have a very good 
reason in favor of intervening (namely, averting E). So if Lola chooses B, intervening to 
 6 
stop E is the only rational action for God. Since God always acts rationally, we can 
conclude that were Lola to choose B, God would intervene to stop E from occurring. 
Thus, Lola cannot be given significant responsibility for Cyril’s wellbeing. 
The divine situation does differ in some important respects from Verity’s situation 
in the original toxin puzzle. First, God’s “toxin,” which is allowing B to cause evil E, 
can be “ingested” only if the hoped for good fails to obtain. Second, God’s intending to 
ingest the toxin is not enough to secure the possibility of the hoped for good. Rather, 
it must be the case that God would ingest the toxin if presented with the possibility. 
An analogous toxin story would go as follows: The billionaire will flip a coin. If the 
coin lands heads, the billionaire will not give Verity any money but will present her 
with a toxin that causes nausea for a minute and which she may drink if she so 
chooses. If the coin lands tails, then the billionaire will not give Verity a toxin but will 
give her a million dollars if and only if it is the case that had the coin landed heads, 
Verity would have drunk the toxin. The logic rehearsed by Kavka suggests that Verity 
could not rationally drink the toxin if the coin landed heads, and that as long as Verity 
is rational she cannot profit from the billionaire’s offer. 
If for analogous reasons God cannot ensure that God would not intervene to stop E 
should Lola choose badly, then there would be no way for God to pursue the good of 
Lola’s positively exercising significant responsibility for Cyril’s wellbeing. In this case, 
the initially promising Responsibility Theodicy would prove to be incoherent. 
 
3. Some problematic solutions 
 
A. Divine self-binding 
In the original toxin puzzle, Kavka stipulates that Verity can neither restrict the 
actions available to her when presented with the toxin (for example, by planting a chip 
in her brain that compels her to drink the toxin) nor change the costs and benefits 
associated with drinking the toxin (for example, by signing a contract that transfers 
ownership of her house to her worst enemy if she refuses to drink the toxin).7 
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Since God’s situation is not subject to Kavka’s stipulations, one might think that 
God’s toxin puzzle is easily resolved. But some of the solutions available to a human 
agent who is not restricted by Kavka’s stipulations might not be applicable to an 
omnipotent being. Consider first the proposal that God could restrict God’s future self 
so as to make intervention to stop E impossible. While we human beings can 
frequently restrict the actions available to us in some situation (as Odysseus did, 
binding himself to the mast of his ship before passing through the province of the 
sirens), it is far from clear that God could act so as to make the divine will 
inefficacious at some future time.8 Claiming that God can bind God’s future self would 
involve contested metaphysical commitments that go beyond those already 
presupposed by the Responsibility Theodicy. A less metaphysically loaded solution 
would be preferable. 
 
B. Divine promises 
Maybe God could make intervention immoral by promising (to Godself? to a 
human being? to an angel?) not to intervene. Maybe. But serious doubts may be raised 
about this solution. If after Lola chooses B there is really nothing to be gained from 
allowing E to result (prior to consideration of God’s promise), then it seems that no 
good and rational agent would hold God to a promise to not intervene. Since no good 
person would hold God to such a promise, breaking this promise would arguably not 
be morally problematic. Imagine that Verity, unrestricted by any of Kavka’s 
stipulations, made a promise to her sister that she would drink the toxin the next day. 
After winning the million dollars, we can imagine Verity’s sister encouraging her not 
to drink the toxin. After all, Verity already fairly won the money and drinking the 
toxin isn’t necessary or helpful to anyone. Moreover, it will pain the sister to see Verity 
drink the toxin. Verity’s protest that she promised her sister to drink it would not, it 
seems to me, be adequate to justify drinking the toxin. This gives us reason to doubt 
the “divine promise” solution to the divine toxin puzzle. 
 
C. The intrinsic badness of divine intervention 
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If divine intervention in the natural order is intrinsically very bad (because 
nomological regularity is intrinsically very good), and if the intrinsic badness of God’s 
intervening to stop E outweighed the badness of E, then God would not face a toxin 
puzzle after all. If Lola chose action B, God’s intervening to stop B from leading to E 
would be worse than allowing E to take place. In this case, God would not intervene in 
the event that Lola chooses B. Thus, in choosing G Lola would be genuinely 
responsible for averting E.  
Is it plausible that for every evil that has occurred, the divine intervention needed 
to avert that evil would have been intrinsically worse than the evil itself? I suspect that 
many will join me in thinking that this is not an especially plausible thesis, even if it 
isn’t downright absurd.9 The proponent of the Responsibility Theodicy has reason to 
hope for a more satisfying solution to the toxin puzzle problem. 
 
D. Epistemic side effects of intervention 
The final solution to be considered in this section argues that if God intervened to 
stop Lola’s bad choice from leading to E, this would undermine the epistemic 
conditions required for meaningful human responsibility in the future.10 To illustrate 
the solution, suppose that on a trip to a nearby national park, Lola crosses a bridge 
spanning a deep gorge and notices that one of the planks in the bridge is weakened by 
significant rot that, if not replaced, could lead to someone’s death. Upon reaching the 
other side, Lola considers notifying a park ranger about the dangerous bridge. She 
doesn’t see any ranger around, notes that she’s hungry and eager for dinner, and 
decides not to bother. Now suppose that the following day, young Cyril steps on the 
plank but is prevented from falling to his death by an imperceptible act of divine 
intervention that prevents the plank from collapsing. The following day a park ranger 
sees the problem and it is fixed before anyone gets hurt. According to the present 
solution, God’s intervening in the envisioned way would likely result in a worse 
outcome than letting the boy fall to his death. The reason is that divine intervention is 
likely to have epistemic side effects that would in some way diminish the degree of 
meaningful creaturely responsibility in the future. 
 9 
What epistemic side effects? Well, suppose that at some future time Lola finds 
herself in a situation where doing the conscientious thing really would help someone 
(since in this case God would not intervene to prevent the bad effects of Lola’s 
negligence). Despite the fact that Lola now finds herself in a situation where she has 
significant responsibility, God’s past act of saving Cyril might compromise Lola’s 
ability to recognize the responsibility she currently has. Lola might remember that 
evening years ago when she neglected to tell anyone about the rotten plank and 
nothing bad came of it, and this might mislead her into thinking that acting in a 
conscientious manner is unlikely to make any difference. And of course others besides 
Lola might be misled into underestimating their responsibility as a result of God’s 
saving Cyril. Had Cyril fallen to his death, the reporting of this event would no doubt 
have buttressed many people’s appreciation of life’s fragility and the importance of 
their making conscientious and caring choices. So divine intervention to stop the evil 
effects of bad choices may result in an evidential situation that leads people to a lower 
estimation of their responsibility. And this in turn may make people less likely to 
choose loving and courageous actions and may compromise the value that could 
otherwise be gained from putting creatures in a position of genuine responsibility. 
There are various problems with this “epistemic side effects” solution to the divine 
toxin puzzle. First, the proposal arguably presupposes a solution rather than supplying 
one. The puzzle is that it seems that God cannot give Lola real responsibility for Cyril, 
since (i) for Lola to be responsible God must not intervene should Lola make the bad 
choice, and (ii) if Lola does make the bad choice, intervening is apparently God’s only 
rational option. The proposal under consideration points to putative costs of 
intervention that may make it rational for God to refrain from intervening: 
intervention has epistemic side effects that compromise the value of future situations 
where Lola or other agents are in fact responsible for the wellbeing of another person. 
But note that this reply simply presupposes that there can be a future situation where 
some agent is genuinely responsible for the wellbeing of another person. This is not a 
legitimate supposition in this context, since the toxin puzzle would equally challenge 
the possibility of genuine responsibility in this future situation. If we took it for 
granted that Lola and other agents could be genuinely responsible in the future, then 
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we could perhaps use this fact to explain why in the present case God should not 
intervene to save Cyril. But we cannot take it for granted that there could be 
creaturely responsibility in the future when attempting to explain why creaturely 
responsibility is not inevitably undermined on account of God’s toxin puzzle. 
Second, the proposed solution represents a significant step in the direction of 
Defeat Theodicies, and as a result significantly undercuts the advantage that the 
Responsibility Theodicy may be thought to have over such theodicies. The epistemic 
side effects solution says that if God does not intervene to rescue Cyril, it will be 
because the epistemic effects of such intervention impose a cost that is worse than 
what would be gained by rescuing Cyril. This means that given that Lola made the bad 
decision, Cyril’s death is a welcome development on account of its epistemic effects.11 
This is an unpalatable implication that is not easily squared with commonsense 
attitudes towards evils. Confronted with the tragedy of Cyril’s death, it seems entirely 
appropriate to wish that Cyril had stepped over the weak plank rather than directly on 
it. But according to the present solution, this would be to wish for an overall worse 
outcome. For Cyril’s stepping over the rotten plank would presumably have the same 
epistemic effects as God’s imperceptibly strengthening the plank, and Cyril’s death is 
evidence that God determined that Cyril’s demise was not as bad as the epistemic 
effects of his crossing the bridge alive. So if we accept this solution to God’s toxin 
puzzle, it is arguably inappropriate to regret developments that allowed bad decisions 
to have evil consequences (even if it is appropriate to regret those bad decisions). Such 
troubling implications are exactly what the Responsibility Theodicist seeks to avoid in 
rejecting Defeat Theodicies. 
Finally, even if the previous two problems can be successfully addressed, it remains 
the case that the plausibility of the Responsibility Theodicy is significantly reduced if 
the divine toxin puzzle can be addressed only by appealing to the epistemic side 
effects of divine intervention. If this solution to the puzzle is all we have, then God 
could grant responsibility only when the epistemic distortion that would result from 
divine intervention is worse than the evil that would otherwise result. Since it is very 
hard to believe that our responsibility is limited in this way (even if we cannot prove 
otherwise), the Responsibility Theodicist should seek a solution that could explain a 
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greater level of responsibility. I turn to the development of such a solution in the next 
section.  
 
4. The decision-theoretic solution 
 
Like the epistemic side effects solution just considered, the decision-theoretic 
solution relies on the fact that the situation involving Lola and Cyril is one of many 
similarly structured situations. We might say that God will confront the decision to 
ingest the “toxin” of non-intervention not just once, but on many occasions. To see 
why this is so significant, consider again the revised (and more analogous) toxin story 
described in section 2, where if a coin lands heads Verity is presented with a toxin and 
if it lands tails she is given a million dollars if and only if she would have drunk the 
toxin had the coin landed heads. If Verity knows that she will be given this offer only 
once, then Kavka’s reasoning supports the conclusion that Verity cannot make the 
relevant conditional true and thus cannot profit from the situation. But suppose that 
Verity knows that the billionaire will present Verity with this offer some large but 
indefinite number of times. In this case, does Verity have a reason that rationalizes 
drinking the toxin when the coin lands heads? 
If evidential decision theory is correct, then Verity clearly does have a reason that 
rationalizes drinking the toxin when the coin lands heads. Suppose the first toss 
comes up heads. Since the situation Verity now faces is relevantly like the situation 
that she would face in future tosses that lands heads, Verity knows that the choice she 
makes now after the first toss is the same as the choice she would make in future 
tosses that lands heads. (This assumes that only one choice is rational, and that as an 
impeccable rational agent Verity knows that she will always make the uniquely 
rational choice.) So Verity can reason as follows: “If I drink the toxin now, then in 
subsequent tosses where the coin lands tails, it will be true that I would have drunk 
the toxin had the coin landed heads. So if I drink the toxin now, I will be paid $1 
million in future tosses where the coin lands tails. If I do not drink the toxin now, then 
in subsequent tosses where the coin lands tails, it will not be true that I would have 
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drunk the toxin had the coin landed heads. So if I do not drink the toxin now, I will be 
paid nothing in future tosses that land tails. Since I will be paid in future tosses if and 
only if I drink the toxin now, I have reason to drink the toxin.” 
Unfortunately, this reasoning is fallacious from the perspective of causal decision 
theory. While Verity’s decision to drink the toxin may be conclusive evidence that the 
relevant subjunctive conditional will be true in future tosses, this does not mean that 
drinking the toxin causes the conditional to be true in future tosses. And according to 
the causal decision theorist, Verity’s desire that this conditional be true can give her a 
reason to drink the toxin right now only if the truth value of this conditional causally 
depends on her drinking the toxin in this particular case. A mere evidential 
connection between the conditional and her present choice would not supply a reason 
for acting. 
Still, for the evidential decision theorist, a rationale for drinking the toxin is 
available in the multiple coin toss case that is not available in the single toss case. And 
since God’s situation is analogous to the multiple coin toss case, the evidential 
decision theorist can endorse a decision-theoretic solution to the divine toxin puzzle. 
God’s reason for not intervening in the event that Lola chooses B is that if God refrains 
from intervening in this situation, then in similar future situations where Lola or 
someone else makes a good choice, they will be responsible for averting the evil that 
would have resulted from the bad choice since God would not have intervened to stop 
this evil consequence. But the justification for this unwieldy “if…then…” claim is purely 
evidential: God’s choice to not intervene in the present case may be conclusive 
evidence that God would not intervene in other similar cases, but we have not yet 
provided any reason for thinking that God’s choice in the present case causally 
contributes to its being the case that God would not intervene in similar situations. 
Returning to Verity’s iterated toxin case, do we have any reason to think that her 
drinking the toxin when the first toss lands heads could cause it to be the case that she 
would also drink it in future tosses? I tentatively suggest that we do.12 My argument 
for the possibility of a causal relationship between Verity’s drinking the toxin and the 
truth of the relevant subjunctive conditional (in future tosses) has two steps. First, I 
suggest that anytime a fully rational agent decides (on the basis of explicit reflection) 
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to follow some action plan in circumstance C, the agent endorses following an 
equivalent action plan (or policy) in all circumstances that are (by her lights) 
relevantly similar to C.13 In this context, another circumstance qualifies as being 
relevantly similar to C if it shares with C features that provide sufficient reason for 
following the action plan in question. Since a rational agent treats like cases alike, or 
at least is willing to treat like cases alike, a reflective decision to act reveals a rational 
commitment to the appropriateness of acting equivalently in a wider set of situations 
that are relevantly like the one at hand. Second, this endorsement may have effects 
even after the agent has carried out the action plan in circumstance C; in particular, 
assuming nothing has happened to change the agent’s rational perspective or 
dispositions, this endorsement may make it the case that the agent would follow the 
same action plan in future circumstances that are relevantly similar to C. So in settling 
on a course of action, the agent may determine both what she will do in the present 
circumstance and what she would do in other similar circumstances (assuming there 
are no intervening changes in her rational perspective). If this is right, then Verity’s 
decision (after the first coin lands heads) to follow the simple action plan “drink the 
toxin” constitutes an endorsement of this action plan in situations taken to be 
relevantly similar, and this endorsement may cause it to be the case that she would 
drink the toxin in some such situations in the future. Since by her lights any future 
toss where the coin lands heads is relevantly like this particular occasion, her 
following the action plan “drink the toxin” on this occasion could make the relevant 
subjunctive conditional true for future tosses as well. Verity therefore has a good 
reason to drink the toxin, since making the relevant conditional true could enable her 
to win money in future tosses. And since Verity has an overwhelmingly good reason to 
drink the toxin (and since she always acts rationally), it is true even before she drinks 
the toxin for the first time that she would drink it when a coin lands heads. 
The same reasoning may be transposed to God’s situation. If Lola chooses B and 
God follows the action plan “refrain from intervening,” God thereby endorses 
following this action plan in future situations that God judges to be relevantly similar. 
This endorsement would arguably make it the case that God would refrain from 
intervening in relevantly similar situations. God therefore has a forward-looking 
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reason to refrain from intervening to stop E when Lola chooses B. By not intervening 
in this case, God causes it to be the case that God would not intervene in similar 
situations in the future, thereby securing the possibility that in these future situations 
creatures can be responsible for averting great evils.14 
Unfortunately, from the perspective of standard causal decision theory, the 
rationality of accepting the (literal or figurative) toxin is not established merely by 
showing that doing so causes it to be the case that in future situations the toxin would 
be accepted. What really matters from the perspective of causal decision theory is not 
what an action causes to be the case, but rather what difference the action makes, 
where the difference an action makes is characterized in terms of subjunctive (or 
“counterfactual”) conditionals that specify what the outcomes would be were the 
agent to act in a certain way.15 Of course the difference that my action makes is closely 
related to what that action causes. But these may come apart when some state of 
affairs that would be caused by my doing action A is causally overdetermined or would 
be caused by something else were I to refrain from doing action A. For example, the 
fact that my garden needs water before tomorrow’s heat wave may not make it 
rational for me to water my garden today if I know that there is going to be a large 
rainstorm tonight. I can cause the desired state (the garden’s receiving water before 
tomorrow), but doing so will make no difference as to whether the state comes about. 
Quite reasonably, causal decision theory says that when I know it will rain tonight, the 
value that attaches to the garden receiving water before tomorrow has no bearing on 
the question of whether I should water the garden today. 
Turning now to Verity’s decision whether to drink the toxin when the first coin 
lands heads, does her drinking the toxin right now make a difference as to whether 
she would drink the toxin in some future toss? It seems not. To see why, consider 
Verity’s decision situation after a coin lands heads for a second time and she is 
presented with a toxin. If Verity is rational, then her decision whether to drink the 
toxin will supervene on facts about costs and benefits associated with drinking or not 
drinking. And whether she drank the toxin the first time the coin landed heads, and 
what actions she endorsed then, does not in any way affect the costs and benefits 
associated with drinking or not drinking on this occasion. Thus, whether she drank 
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the toxin the first time, and what she endorsed on that occasion, will make no 
difference with respect to whether she will drink the toxin this time around. Even if 
her action in the first heads toss caused her action in the second heads toss, her 
decision in the first heads toss would not make a difference as to what happens in the 
second toss. What happens in the second toss will inevitably align with cost and 
benefit facts that Verity cannot influence at the time when she first drinks the toxin.  
All this would seem to imply that Verity has no forward-looking reason to drink 
the toxin after the first toss lands heads. As the example of the garden and the coming 
rainstorm apparently shows, the goodness of some state of affairs does not give me a 
reason to contribute to bringing about that state of affairs if I know that this state of 
affairs would obtain whether or not I contribute to bringing it about. And if Verity has 
no forward-looking reason to drink the toxin, then drinking the toxin is surely 
irrational (since the immediate effects of drinking the toxin are purely negative). We 
thus have a powerful line of reasoning, reasoning that accords with causal decision 
theory, to the conclusion that Verity will not drink the toxin and will not profit in the 
iterated toxin case. And the same reasoning of course implies that God has no 
forward-looking reason to refrain from intervening to stop evils, and thus that the 
decision-theoretic solution fails. 
A critical premise in the above argument is the following: 
 
Difference-Making Principle: The goodness of some state of affairs does not give 
an agent a reason to contribute to bringing about that state of affairs if she is 
certain that the state of affairs would obtain whether or not she contributes to 
bringing it about. 
 
This premise, which follows from standard causal decision theory, is initially plausible. 
But I believe the principle is subject to compelling counterexamples. Putative 
counterexamples to causal decision theory developed by Andy Egan (2007) do, I think, 
hint at worries for the Difference-Making Principle (though they are not, strictly 
speaking, counterexamples to the principle).16 But instead of diving into a discussion 
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of Egan’s cases, I will offer a case that is structurally similar to Egan’s cases but that is 
a straightforward counterexample to the Difference-Making Principle. Here’s the case: 
 
Button Game: Gavin and Hilda are put in different rooms, each of which contains 
a large red button. Before each leaves their room, they will choose whether or not 
to press the button. If at least one of them presses the button in their room, then 
Gavin and Hilda will each win $1 million. If neither presses the button, then they 
will win nothing. No communication is allowed before they both leave the room. 
There is, of course, a catch. Pressing the button will cause a mildly painful (but 
ultimately harmless) shock. Gavin and Hilda are told all of this information and 
left to make their choices. They know with certainty that they are both impeccable 
rational agents who will not fail to choose rationally. They also know that neither 
of them would like to experience the shock, but that for each of them the value of 
the money vastly outweighs the disvalue of the shock.  
 
Should Gavin press the button in this case? The answer looks to be perfectly clear: of 
course he should! But if the Difference-Making Principle is true, then we must reject 
this intuitive verdict. For suppose that pressing the button is the rational choice. As an 
impeccable rational agent, Gavin will be certain of this. He will also be certain that 
Hilda will press the button in her room, since he knows her to be perfectly rational 
and in a symmetrical situation. But this means that Gavin is certain that he and Hilda 
would win their money whether or not he pressed his button. Applying the 
Difference-Making Principle, this implies that the goodness of winning the money 
does not give Gavin a reason to press the button. And since this is the only reason 
Gavin could have for pressing the button, and since Gavin has a reason to refrain from 
pressing the button (avoiding the shock), it follows that it is not rational for Gavin to 
press the button, contrary to our original supposition. So if we accept the Difference-
Making Principle, we cannot coherently affirm the intuitive view that Gavin should 
press the button.17 
This result strikes me as a very good reason for rejecting the Difference-Making 
Principle and standard causal decision theory, which has that principle as an 
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implication. (Which alternative theory should be embraced is a question that I will 
not pursue here. There are, however, decision theories intermediate between the 
standard evidential and causal approaches that do deliver the intuitively correct 
verdict in the Button Game.18) Moreover, there are good reasons for thinking that the 
reasons why the Difference-Making Principle fails in the Button Game are also reasons 
that apply in Verity’s iterated toxin case. In the Button Game, the fact that there is a 
cogent rationale for pushing the button would itself be evidence that another agent 
will bring about the desired outcome and thus that pushing the button makes no 
difference. Unlike the garden example, where the desired outcome is guaranteed by 
the rainstorm for reasons that are independent of whether I have a rational basis for 
watering the garden, in the Button Game it is the supposed reasonability of pushing 
the button that would ensure that Hilda would press her button (whatever Gavin may 
do), making the desired result causally overdetermined and thereby undermining the 
supposition that pushing the button is reasonable (given the Difference-Making 
Principle). The same structure applies in Verity’s case. The supposed fact that she has 
an adequate forward-looking reason for drinking the toxin before her (namely, making 
the desired conditional true in future tosses) would also ensure that future Verity 
would drink her toxin (whatever present Verity may do), which in turn makes the 
desired conditional overdetermined, thereby undermining the supposition that 
drinking the toxin is rational (given the Difference-Making Principle). In both cases, 
the fact that rationality favors a certain option would make the desired outcome 
overdetermined. If we judge that pushing the button is rational in the Button Game 
case, despite the fact that Gavin would know that the desired result is overdetermined, 
then we should reject the argument given above which holds that Verity cannot 
rationally drink the toxin for sake of making true the relevant conditional since her 
drinking the toxin does not make a difference to whether or not the conditional is 
true. 
Here, then, is what I think would happen in Verity’s toxin case. The first time a 
coin lands heads and she is presented with the toxin, she drinks the toxin because in 
doing so she endorses the action plan of drinking the toxin in such situations, and this 
endorsement (which we might describe as Verity’s “settling” on a certain course of 
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action) makes it the case that Verity would drink the toxin in future tosses (should the 
coin land heads) and therefore ensures that Verity will win one million dollars should 
the next coin (or coins) land tails. Granted, Verity knows that if she was temporarily 
irrational and refrained from drinking the toxin, then the desired conditional would 
still be true in future tosses (as long as her rationality was fully restored and future 
rational lapses were not possible). So there is a sense in which her presently endorsing 
the “drink the toxin” plan does not make a difference, since the rationality of her 
future self suffices to make it true that in future tosses she would drink the toxin. But 
I’ve argued that the Difference-Making Principle is false and that it can be rational to 
act for sake of bringing about some desired end by means of some costly action even if 
it is known that the desired end would obtain whatever one does. 
 
5. The solution’s advantages and limitations 
 
The advantages of the decision-theoretic solution over the first three solutions 
explored in section 3 is clear: it avoids the controversial metaphysical commitments of 
the self-binding solution, the controversial moral commitments of the divine promises 
solution, and the controversial axiological commitments of the solution that invokes 
the intrinsic badness of divine intervention.19 It is worth taking a bit of time to spell 
out why the decision-theoretic solution is highly preferable to the (vaguely similar) 
epistemic side effects solution. Consider again young Cyril running across the bridge 
over the gorge. Suppose Cyril faces a free choice between sprinting over the bridge and 
merely jogging. If Cyril sprints, it so happens that he will not step on the rotten plank; 
if he jogs, he will step on the plank. Suppose further that God would not intervene to 
save Cyril in the event that he steps on the plank. It seems that proponents of the 
epistemic side effects solution are committed to saying that from the fact that God 
would not intervene to save Cyril, we can infer that it would be better if Cyril chooses 
to jog (resulting in his death) than if he chooses to sprint (thereby preserving his life). 
For on their view, God’s non-intervention is explained by the fact that the epistemic 
distortion that would result from divine intervention is worse than Cyril’s death. And 
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since the same epistemic distortion would result if Cyril sprints and happens to avoid 
the rotten plank (without divine intervention), it seems to follow that Cyril’s jogging 
and dying would be a better outcome than his sprinting and living. The decision-
theoretic solution does not have this nasty implication. While God must refrain from 
intervening in order to preserve creaturely responsibility in future situations, nothing 
good would come of Cyril’s death itself. God may legitimately hope that Cyril chooses 
to sprint, and the commonsense judgment that it would have been better if Cyril had 
luckily avoided the rotten plank is not threatened. Cyril’s death is not a means towards 
any greater good and may rightly be recognized as tragic, even if divine intervention 
was ruled out as too costly. 
While the decision-theoretic solution to the puzzle does have significant 
advantages over the proposals considered in the previous section, the decision-
theoretic solution also has its own liabilities (even if we have no problem rejecting 
causal decision theory). If we rely on the decision-theoretic solution alone, the 
Responsibility Theodicy has trouble explaining the possibility of an evil that is 
temporally last or an evil that is much worse than all other potential evils. First, 
suppose God knows that choice n is the last choice involving significant responsibility. 
Given this knowledge, God has no future-oriented reason to refrain from intervening if 
the bad choice is made; so God would intervene if the bad choice is made; thus, n is 
not a choice involving significant responsibility, which contradicts our original 
supposition. It would seem, then, that if we rely only on the decision-theoretic 
solution, we must deny that there is ever a choice that God knows to be the last choice 
involving significant responsibility. Perhaps this is not a problem. Maybe the theist 
can simply deny that there is such a last choice. Such a denial is compatible with the 
view that there will be an end to the era of human responsibility for averting evil. For 
example, God could guarantee that there are 20 choices that are tied for last, rather 
than a single last choice. In this case, God’s reason for not intervening in the instances 
where a bad choice is made would be to confer responsibility on the agents who 
simultaneously made a good choice. Alternatively, the theist could grant the 
possibility of a last significantly responsible choice but simply acknowledge that if 
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there is one, God doesn’t know in advance which choice it is (perhaps because this is 
determined by a free or random process that even God cannot predict in advance). 
Another argument raises problems for the possibility that God could know of some 
choice that it is the costliest (if the bad choice is made). To see why, consider the 
iterated toxin case, but with the following twist. Normally, when the coin lands heads 
Verity is presented with a green toxin that causes nausea for one minute. But Verity is 
told that for exactly one coin toss, if the coin lands heads she will be given a red toxin 
that causes nausea for two minutes. The series of coin tosses commences, and for the 
first several tosses, when the coin lands heads Verity drinks the green toxin, and when 
it lands tails she is given a million dollars. But before the 23rd toss, the billionaire 
announces that this is the toss where the red toxin will be presented should the coin 
land heads. Upon hearing this, Verity knows that she will not earn any money should 
this particular coin land tails. To see why, consider the situation Verity would face if 
the coin lands heads and she is presented with the red toxin. Normally, Verity has 
reason to drink the green toxin since endorsing the policy of drinking the toxin allows 
her to make money in future coin tosses. But once she’s already been presented with 
the red toxin, she knows that endorsing the policy of drinking the green toxin and 
refusing the red toxin has the same expected payoff in future coin tosses as endorsing 
the policy of always drinking the toxin. And the nauseating effect of the red toxin gives 
her a reason to prefer following the former policy. So if the red toxin is presented, 
Verity, being rational, will follow the “drink green toxins only” policy and refuse the 
red toxin. This is why she cannot profit from the coin toss where the red toxin would 
be presented.20 Analogous reasoning suggests that the Responsibility Theodicy 
(combined with the decision-theoretic solution to the toxin puzzle) is unable to 
explain how God could permit some evil that God knows is much worse than any 
other potential evils. Again, this may not be a fatal problem for someone who prefers 
the decision-theoretic solution, but it is perhaps an uncomfortable result. 
The degree of discomfort may be heightened by a third argument that combines 
the features focused on in the last two arguments (a potential evil’s “lastness” and its 
unsurpassed badness). If we rely on the decision-theoretic solution alone, the 
Responsibility Theodicy cannot easily explain why human beings would have the 
 21 
power to bring about the extinction of the human species. Suppose that Quinn takes 
some action that, absent divine intervention, is guaranteed to lead to the extinction of 
the human species. According to the decision-theoretic solution, God’s reason for not 
intervening to stop Quinn’s act from destroying the species is that refraining from 
intervening ensures that, when God faces relevantly similar situations in the future, 
God would not intervene (thereby allowing for the possibility of morally significant 
freedom). But this application of the decision-theoretic solution may be incoherent. 
At the moment that God has refrained from intervening long enough to ensure that 
Quinn’s action will result in the destruction of the human species, there arguably 
cannot be any future situations where God will face a situation that is relevantly like 
the decision situation God faced in responding to Quinn’s bad choice. Given the 
imminent destruction of humankind, there may be no remaining human choices that 
are comparable in significance to the choice already made by Quinn. It is therefore 
doubtful that God’s non-intervention in Quinn’s case would serve the good of allowing 
for human responsibility in comparably significant situations. While there may be less 
significant free human choices remaining, God’s non-intervention in past situations 
that were also less significant would suffice to make it the case that God would not 
intervene in these remaining situations. If this is right, then no future good would be 
served by God’s refraining from intervening in order to stop Quinn from destroying 
humanity. So the Responsibility Theodicy and the decision-theoretic solution do not 
seem capable of explaining the commonsense view that human beings do have the 
power to destroy the species.21 Note that the self-binding and divine promises 
solutions described in section 3 have no problem in accounting for our potential to 
bring about our own extinction. God could easily give human beings responsibility for 
human preservation if God could bind Godself to prevent divine intervention to save 
the species, or if God could take some action that would make such intervention 
highly costly or immoral. 
While the decision-theoretic solution seems to me to be the most promising 
approach to the divine toxin puzzle, I’ve suggested that this solution does limit the 
explanatory power of the Responsibility Theodicy in certain (bearable but 
uncomfortable) ways. Of course there may be promising solutions to the divine toxin 
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puzzle that I have not identified, and perhaps others will argue that one of the 
solutions discussed in section 3 is more promising than I have supposed. Whether or 
not one accepts my view on which solution is most satisfactory, I at least hope to have 
shown that the toxin puzzle raises a significant challenge for the Responsibility 
Theodicy, one that any adequate defense of the theodicy must address. And for those 
uninterested in the prospects of the Responsibility Theodicy, the iterated toxin case 
raises puzzling questions that are interesting in their own right. I’ve argued that a 
rational agent could profit in such a situation (even though this conflicts with 
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1 See, for example, (Gauthier 1998; McClennen 1990). 
2 The responsibility theodicy thus presupposes “open theism,” which holds (in opposition to 
theological determinism and Molinism) that God cannot know in advance what some creature 
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would freely do in various possible circumstances. (Or at least God cannot always know this in 
advance. On some more attenuated libertarian conceptions of free will, an act can count as 
free even if it is causally determined by the agent’s character, as long as that character was 
formed on the basis of one or more “base case” free choices that were not causally determined 
by anything. Given this conception of free will, God could know in advance what some agent 
would do if a freely-formed character would determine her to do it, but God still could not 
know in advance what an agent would do in “base case” instances of free choice.) 
3 Here I suppose that the outcomes of Lola’s actions are deterministic rather than probabilistic. 
A more careful discussion of Lola’s responsibility would be required if we allow that B only 
results in E’s having a certain probability (one that is higher than the probability resulting 
from G). But I believe that this added complexity would not affect any of the central problems 
or solutions to be considered. 
4 More precisely, we have an explanation of why there is significant moral evil—evil that is the 
result of free choices of moral agents. Natural evil that does not result from the choice of 
creatures requires a different explanation. 
5 This point is emphasized in (Hasker 1992). Even if the Responsibility Theodicy is correct, it is 
possible that some evils are allowed for sake of goods that they make possible and which 
defeat them. But this is not essential to the Responsibility Theodicy, and there is no pressure 
to affirm that the majority of evils are defeated. 
6 Of course much more would need to be said in order to fully support the claim that Defeat 
Theodicies conflict with commonsense attitudes regarding evils and that this conflict 
constitutes a significant count against Defeat Theodicies. That is not the focus of this paper. 
Here, I only aim to give the reader a sense of the (putative) explanatory advantage of the 
Responsibility Theodicy. 
7 Additionally, Kavka stipulates that no significant bad comes from Verity’s going back on 
some intention. Thus, she does not change the payoffs associated with refusing the toxin 
merely by forming the intention not to drink it. 
8 Presumably, the possibility sort of divine self-binding would be rejected by those who agree 
with Mavrodes (1963) and others that God could not make a stone that is too heavy for God to 
lift.  
9 For an interesting and helpful discussion of appeals in theodicy to the intrinsic goodness of 
nomological regularity, see (Murray 2008, chs. 5-6). 
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10 Thanks to [NAME REMOVED] for urging me to consider this suggestion, and for helpful 
discussion. 
11 Of course this is compatible with it being the case that the best scenario would be the one 
where Lola makes the right decision and thereby prevents Cyril’s death. 
12 [ACKNOWLEDGMENT REMOVED]. 
13 To clarify, an “action plan” may involve a simple action (e.g., “drink the toxin”), or it may 
involve a decision procedure that has more than one possible outcome. So when we observe a 
tennis player counter a deep cross-court shot with a cross-court shot of his own, we cannot 
conclude that he endorses hitting a cross-court shot in all equivalent situations (even if we 
were to assume his shots are fully reflective actions). Rather, the action plan may be something 
like “typically counter with a crosscourt shot, but sometimes hit it down the line, and even 
more rarely hit a drop shot.” 
14 It may be helpful to underscore the difference between this account and the account of the 
evidential decision theorist. Consider a revised scenario where Verity knows that after every 
coin toss, she will be given some time to drink the toxin (if applicable) and then her memory 
of the toss will be erased and her brain (and soul, if she has one!) will be completely “reset” 
back to the its state just before the coin was tossed. Because this process would break any 
causal connection between Verity’s choice in the present toss and her choice in future tosses, a 
decision theory that ranks options according to their causal effects would have to concede that 
in this case Verity has no reason to drink the toxin when a coin lands heads. But the reasoning 
offered by the evidential decision theorist would not be affected. 
15 As Edgington (2011, 78) and others have observed, standard causal decision theory would be 
more aptly named “counterfactual decision theory.” 
16 Egan’s “Psychopath Button Case” involves Paul, who is highly confident that he is not a 
psychopath, deliberating over whether to press a button that would kill all living psychopaths. 
Paul would prefer to live in a world where all the psychopaths are killed, as long as this didn’t 
involve his getting killed. But Paul’s pressing the button would constitute very strong evidence 
that Paul is a psychopath, and thus that pressing the button would result in his death. Egan 
maintains (quite plausibly) that pressing the button is irrational. The case raises worries for 
the Difference-Making Principle. The good that motivates Paul’s refraining from pressing the 
button is the good of staying alive; but if Paul does not press the button, Paul is highly 
confident that he is not a psychopath and thus that not pressing the button makes no 
difference to whether Paul stays alive. Because Paul is not certain that he is not a psychopath 
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(and thus not certain that his not pressing the button makes no difference to whether he stays 
alive), the Pyschopath Button Case is not, strictly speaking, a counterexample to the 
Difference-Making Principle. If we stipulated that Paul was certain, then it arguably becomes 
rational for him to press the button (since on standard Bayesian models, certainty that p is 
preserved even in the face of very strong evidence for not-p). 
17 From the fact that the causal decision theorist cannot affirm that Gavin should press the 
button, it does not follow that according to causal decision theory he should not press the 
button. Rather, I think the right think to say about this case is that causal decision theory does 
not issue a determinate verdict, at least not if we accept the supposition that Gavin is certain 
about the requirements of rationality and the fact that Hilda will conform to those 
requirements. Any reasons that establish the rationality of not pushing the button would also 
establish that Hilda will not press the button which in turn implies that Gavin rationally ought 
to push the button (since doing so would cause him to win money that he would otherwise 
forgo). Given standard causal decision theory, a rationale for either option is self-defeating. In 
this respect, applying causal decision theory to the Button Game exhibits a kind of decision 
instability that is reminiscent of the instability that characterizes the much-discussed “Death 
in Damascus” case (Gibbard & Harper 1978). But unlike the Death in Damascus case (and like 
Egan’s cases), there does seem to be a unique rational decision in the Button Game. 
18 For proposals that deliver the correct verdict, see, e.g., (Edgington 2011; Wedgwood 2011). 
19 I myself feel that all of these commitments are more doubtful than the claim that it is 
rational for Verity to drink the toxins in the iterated toxin case. And this is true even though 
causal decision theory seems unable to support this verdict. Since causal decision theory 
supports a manifestly (to me!) irrational verdict in the structurally similar Button Game, the 
incompatibility of the decision theoretic solution with causal decision theory does not strike 
me as a significant cost at all. Of course others may weigh the balance of reasons differently. 
20 One might argue that my treatment of the red toxin case generalizes in a way that conflicts 
with my view that Verity could profit in the original multiple coin toss case. Here’s how such 
an argument would go. Going back to this original multiple coin toss case, suppose the 14th 
coin toss lands heads and Verity is presented with a toxin. It seems that Verity could rehearse 
the following reasoning, which is analogous to the reasoning she gives in the red toxin case: 
“Now that I know that coin 14 landed heads, I also know that the policy of drinking every toxin 
except the toxin presented on the 14th toss will lead to the same payout as the policy of 
drinking all of the toxins presented to me. Since I have a reason to prefer the ‘drink all toxins 
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except toxin 14’ policy (the reason being that it will lead to a bit less nausea), I should adopt 
this policy and refrain from taking the toxin on this occasion.” If this line of reasoning is 
rational, then we can predict that Verity will engage in this sort of reasoning on every occasion 
that she is presented with a toxin; and this means that she would not drink any toxin and 
therefore cannot profit from the arrangement. Since the envisioned line of reasoning is 
analogous to the reasoning she employs in the red toxin case, if we endorse this reasoning in 
the red toxin case then we should deny that Verity can profit in the multiple coin toss case. 
That is the argument against my position. Here’s where the argument goes wrong. If an agent 
rationally does some action x in circumstances C, he thereby adopts a policy that generalizes 
to every situation that the he takes to be relevantly similar to C. So if Verity rationally does the 
action of “adopting the policy to drink all toxins except number 14,” there must be some policy 
that she adopts that generalizes to every situation that she takes to be relevantly like her 
current situation. Consider the situation where coin toss 7 comes up heads and Verity is 
handed a toxin. This situation is (by Verity’s lights) relevantly similar to her situation in toss 
14. But Verity would not endorse the action of “adopting the policy to drink all toxins except 
number 14” in the event that toss 7 landed heads. This action would be irrational by her lights, 
since it would undermine her ability to win money in toss 14. So when Verity skips toxin 14, 
there must be a more general policy that she is also adopting that applies to all relevantly 
similar cases. And clearly there is. The policy she adopts may be put as follows: for any toss n 
that lands heads, adopt the policy of drinking all toxins except toxin n. This is the policy that 
produces equivalent results in all relevantly similar cases. But quite clearly, adopting this 
policy is not rational, since adopting it would make it the case that Verity would not drink any 
toxin, and would therefore eliminate the possibility of winning any money. Now turn to the 
red toxin case. When Verity is presented with the red toxin and decides not to drink it and to 
only drink the green toxins, she adopts a policy to act analogously in all relevantly similar 
cases. But since none of the other coin tosses are relevantly like her current situation (since 
none of them have the salient feature of being the uniquely worst outcome), Verity’s action of 
skipping the red toxin does not amount to endorsing any actions in the other coin tosses. 
Skipping the red toxin has no bearing on the other tosses and therefore does not compromise 
Verity’s ability to profit from the arrangement. 
21 Or at least they do not seem capable of explaining this fact if we assume that the existence of 
the human species is an unrepeatable event and that there are not other species of comparable 
moral significance that God interacts with. 
